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²¹ 1 Foreword

The Platform Management Components Intercommunication (PMCI) working group of the DMTF prepared the Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification (DSP0274). DMTF is a not-for-profit association of industry members that promotes enterprise and systems management and interoperability. For information about the DMTF, see https://www.dmtf.org.

²³ 2 Acknowledgments

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²⁶ 3 Abstract

The Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification defines messages, data objects, and sequences for performing message exchanges between devices over a variety of transport and physical media. The description of message exchanges includes authentication of hardware identities and measurement for firmware identities. The SPDM enables efficient access to low-level security capabilities and operations. Other mechanisms, including non-PMCI- and DMTF-defined mechanisms, can use the SPDM.

²⁸ 4 Document conventions

- Document titles appear in italics.
- The first occurrence of each important term appears in *italics* with a link to its definition.
- · ABNF rules appear in a monospaced font.

²⁹ 4.1 Scope

- This specification describes how to use messages, data objects, and sequences to exchange messages between two devices over a variety of transports and physical media. This specification contains the message exchanges, sequence diagrams, message formats, and other relevant semantics for such message exchanges, including authentication of hardware identities and firmware measurement.
- Other specifications define the mapping of these messages to different transports and physical media. This specification provides information to enable security policy enforcement but does not specify individual policy decisions.

4.2 Normative references

- The following documents are indispensable for the application of this specification. For dated or versioned references, only the edition cited, including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions, applies. For references without a date or version, the latest published edition of the referenced document (including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions) applies.
 - ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents 2018 (8th edition)
 - DMTF DSP0004, Common Information Model (CIM) Metamodel, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/ standards/documents/DSP0004_3.0.1.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0223, Generic Operations, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0223_1.0.1.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0236, MCTP Base Specification 1.3.0, https://dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0236_1.3.0.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0239, MCTP IDs and Codes 1.6.0, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/ DSP0239_1.6.0.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0240, Platform Level Data Model (PLDM) Base Specification, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/ standards/documents/DSP0240_1.0.0.pdf
 - DMTF DSP0275, Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) over MCTP Binding Specification, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0275
 - DMTF DSP1001, Management Profile Usage Guide, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/

documents/DSP1001_1.2.0.pdf

- ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents, https://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink.exe?func=Il&objId=4230456&objAction=browse&sort=subtype
- IETF RFC5234, Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF, January 2008
- IETF RFC5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, May 2008
- USB Authentication Specification Rev 1.0 with ECN and Errata through January 7, 2019
- TCG Algorithm Registry, Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 01.27, February 7, 2018
- ASN.1 ISO-822-1-4
 - ITU-T X.680, 08/2015
 - ITU-T X.681, 08/2015
 - ITU-T X.682, 08/2015
 - ITU-T X.683, 08/2015
- DER ISO-8825-1
 - ITU-T X.690, 08/2015
- X.509 ISO-9594-8
 - ITU-T X.509, 08/2015
- ECDSA
 - Section 6, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 - Appendix D: Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use in FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
- RSA
 - Table 3 in TCG Algorithm Registry Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.22, February 9, 2015
- SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512
 - FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
- SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512
 - FIPS PUB 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions

4.3 Terms and definitions

- In this document, some terms have a specific meaning beyond the normal English meaning. This clause defines those terms.
- The terms "shall" ("required"), "shall not", "should" ("recommended"), "should not" ("not recommended"), "may", "need not" ("not required"), "can" and "cannot" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7. The terms in parenthesis are alternatives for the preceding term, for use in exceptional cases when the preceding term cannot be used for linguistic reasons. Note that ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7 specifies additional alternatives. Occurrences of such additional alternatives shall be interpreted in their normal English meaning.

- The terms "clause", "subclause", "paragraph", and "annex" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/ IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 6.
- The terms "normative" and "informative" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives,
 Part 2, Clause 3. In this document, clauses, subclauses, or annexes labeled "(informative)" do not contain normative
 content. Notes and examples are always informative elements.
- The terms that DSP0004, DSP0233, DSP0236, DSP0239, DSP0275, and DSP1001 define also apply to this document.
- This specification uses these terms:

Term	Definition				
authentication	Process of determining whether an entity is who or what it claims to be.				
authentication initiator	Endpoint that initiates the authentication process by challenging another endpoint.				
byte	Eight-bit quantity. Also known as an <i>octet</i> . SPDM specifications shall use the term byte, not octet.				
certificate	Digital form of identification that provides information about an entity and certifies ownership of a particular asymmetric key-pair.				
certificate authority (CA)	Trusted third-party entity that issues certificates.				
certificate chain	Series of two or more certificates. Each certificate is signed by the preceding certificate in the chain.				
certificate signing request (CSR)	One of the first steps towards getting a certificate.				
component	Physical entity similar to the PCI Express specification's definition.				
device	Physical entity such as a network card or a fan.				
DMTF	Formerly known as the DMTF, the DMTF creates open manageability standards that span diverse emerging and traditional information technology (IT) infrastructures, including cloud, virtualization, network, servers, and storage. Member companies and alliance partners worldwide collaborate on standards to improve the interoperable management of IT.				
endpoint	Logical entity that communicates with other endpoints over one or more transport protocol.				
intermediate certificate	Certificate that is neither a root certificate nor a leaf certificate.				
leaf certificate	Last certificate in a certificate chain.				
message	See SPDM message.				
message body	Portion of an SPDM message that carries additional data.				
message originator	Original transmitter, or source, of an SPDM message.				

Term	Definition
message transcript	The concatenation of a sequence of messages in the order in which an endpoint sends and receives them. The final message included in the message transcript may be truncated to allow inclusion of a signature in that message, which is computed over the message transcript.
most significant byte (MSB)	Highest order <i>byte</i> in a number consisting of multiple bytes.
	Set of parameters that represent the state of the communication between a corresponding pair of Requester and Responder at the successful completion of the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS messages.
Negotiated State	These parameters may include values provided in VERSION , CAPABILITIES and ALGORITHMS messages.
	Additionally, they may include parameters associated with the transport layer.
	They may include other values deemed necessary by the Requester or Responder to continue or preserve communication with each other.
nibble	Computer term for a four-bit aggregation, or half of a byte.
nonce	Number that is unpredictable to entities other than its generator. The probability of the same number occurring more than once is negligible. Nonce may be generated by combining a pseudo random number of at least 64 bits, optionally concatenated with a monotonic counter of size suitable for the application.
payload	Information-bearing fields of a message. These fields are separate from the fields and elements, such as address fields, framing bits, checksums, and so on, that transport the message from one point to another. In some instances, a field can be both a payload field and a transport field.
physical transport binding	Specifications that define how a base messaging protocol is implemented on a particular physical transport type and medium, such as SMBus/I ² C, PCI Express™ Vendor Defined Messaging, and so on.
Platform Management Component Intercommunications (PMCI)	Working group under the DMTF that defines standardized communication protocols, low-level data models, and transport definitions that support communications with and between management controllers and management devices that form a platform management subsystem within a managed computer system.
Requester	Original transmitter, or source, of an SPDM request message. It is also the ultimate receiver, or destination, of an SPDM response message.
Responder	Ultimate receiver, or destination, of an SPDM request message. It is also the original transmitter, or source of an SPDM response message.
root certificate	First certificate in a certificate chain, which is self-signed.
SPDM message	Unit of communication in SPDM communications.
SPDM message payload	Portion of the message body of an SPDM message. This portion of the message is separate from those fields and elements that identify the SPDM version, the SPDM request and response codes, and the two parameters.
SPDM request message	Message that is sent to an endpoint to request a specific SPDM operation. A corresponding SPDM response message acknowledges receipt of an SPDM request message.

Term	Definition				
SPDM response message	Message that is sent in response to a specific SPDM request message. This message includes a Response Code field that indicates whether the request completed normally.				
trusted computing base (TCB)	Set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security, in the sense that bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside the TCB might jeopardize the security properties of the entire system. By contrast, parts of a computer system outside the TCB must not be able to misbehave in a way that would leak any more privileges than are granted to them in accordance to the security policy. Reference: Trusted computing base				

4.4 Symbols and abbreviated terms

- The abbreviations defined in DSP0004, DSP0223, and DSP1001 apply to this document.
- The following additional abbreviations are used in this document.

Abbreviation Definition				
CA	certificate authority			
CSR	certificate signing request			
MAC	Message Authentication Code			
DMTF	Formerly the Distributed Management Task Force			
MSB most significant byte				
PMCI Platform Management Component Intercommunications				
SPDM Security Protocol and Data Model				
TCB trusted computing base				

44 4.5 Conventions

The following conventions apply to all SPDM specifications.

46 4.5.1 Reserved and unassigned values

- Unless otherwise specified, any reserved, unspecified, or unassigned values in enumerations or other numeric ranges are reserved for future definition by the DMTF.
- 48 Unless otherwise specified, reserved numeric and bit fields shall be written as zero (0) and ignored when read.

49 4.5.2 Byte ordering

50 Unless otherwise specified, for all SPDM specifications *byte* ordering of multi-byte numeric fields or multi-byte bit fields is *little endian*. That is, the lowest byte offset holds the least significant byte, and higher offsets hold the more significant bytes.

4.5.3 SPDM data types

The SPDM data types table lists the abbreviations and descriptions for common data types that SPDM message fields and data structure definitions use. These definitions follow DSP0240.

53 SPDM data types

Data type	Interpretation			
ver8	Eight-bit encoding of the SPDM version number. Version encoding defines the encoding of the version number.			
bitfield8	Byte with eight bit fields. Each bit field can be separately defined.			
bitfield16	Two-byte word with 16-bit fields. Each bit field can be separately defined.			

4.5.4 Version encoding

The SPDMVersion field represents the version of the specification through a combination of *Major* and *Minor* nibbles, encoded as follows:

Version encoding

Version	Matches	Incremented when
Major	Major version field in the SPDMVersion field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification breaks backward compatibility.
Minor	Minor version field in the SPDMVersion field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification maintains backward compatibility.

- 57 EXAMPLE:
- Version $3.7 \rightarrow 0x37$
- Version $1.0 \rightarrow 0 \times 10$
- 60 Version $1.2 \rightarrow 0x12$

- An *endpoint* that supports Version 1.2 can interoperate with an older endpoint that supports Version 1.0 only, but the available functionality is limited to what SPDM specification Version 1.0 defines.
- An endpoint that supports Version 1.2 only and an endpoint that supports Version 3.7 only are not interoperable and shall not attempt to communicate beyond GET_VERSION.
- The detailed version encoding that the VERSION response message returns contains an additional byte that indicates specification bug fixes or development versions. See the Successful VERSION response message table.

4.5.5 Notations

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65 SPDM specifications use the following notations:

66 **SPDM notations**

Notation	Description
M:N	In field descriptions, this notation typically represents a range of byte offsets starting from byte M and continuing to and including byte N ($M\leqN$).
	The lowest offset is on the left. The highest offset is on the right.
[4]	Square brackets around a number typically indicate a bit offset.
[4]	Bit offsets are zero-based values. That is, the least significant bit.
[7:5]	A range of bit offsets.
[7.5]	The most significant bit is on the left, and the least significant bit is on the right.
1b	A lowercase b after a number consisting of 0 s and 1 s indicates that the number is in binary format.
0x12A	A leading 0x indicates that the number is in hexadecimal format.
7+	This indicates a variable length byte range that starts at byte offset 7.

4.6 SPDM message exchanges

- The message exchanges defined in this specification are between two endpoints and are performed and exchanged through sending and receiving of SPDM messages defined in SPDM messages. The SPDM message exchanges are defined in a generic fashion that allows the messages to be communicated across different physical mediums and over different transport protocols.
- The two endpoints have a role of either a Requester or Responder. All messages are paired as request/response with the Requester initiating all communication and the Responder replying to the communication.

- Findpoints may implement both Requester and Responder capabilities. It is possible for a pair of endpoints to be involved with two SPDM message streams between each other with each endpoint having a Requester role and a Responder role. These two streams are mutually exclusive.
- 71 The message exchanges defined in this specification include Requesters that:
 - Discover and negotiate the security capabilities of a Responder.
 - Authenticate the identity of a Responder.
 - Retrieve the firmware measurements of a Responder.
- These message exchange capabilities are built on top of well-known and established security practices across the computing industry. A brief overview for each of the message exchange capabilities is described in the following clauses. Some of the message exchange capabilities are based on the security model defined in USB Authentication Specification Rev 1.0.

4.6.1 Security capability discovery and negotiation

This specification defines a mechanism for a Requester to discover the security capabilities of a Responder. For example, an endpoint could support multiple cryptographic hash functions that are defined in this specification. Furthermore, the specification defines a mechanism for a Requester and Responder to select a common set of cryptographic algorithms to use for all subsequent message exchanges before another negotiation is initiated by the Requester, if an overlapping set of cryptographic algorithms exists that both endpoints support.

4.6.2 Identity authentication

- In this specification, the authenticity of a Responder is determined by digital signatures using well-established techniques based on public key cryptography. A Responder proves its identity by generating digital signatures using a private key, and the signatures can be cryptographically verified by the Requester using the public key associated with that private key.
- 77 At a high-level, the authentication of the identity of a Responder involves these processes:

78 • Identity provisioning

- The process followed by device vendors during or after hardware manufacturing. A trusted root *certificate authority (CA)* generates a *root certificate* (*RootCert*) that is provisioned to the *authentication initiator* to allow the authentication initiator to verify the validity of the digital signatures generated by the endpoint during runtime authentication.
- The root CA also indirectly through the *certificate chain* endorses a per-part public/private key pair, where the private key is provisioned to or generated by the endpoint. A device carries a certificate chain, with the root being the RootCert and the leaf being the device certificate (*DeviceCert*), which contains the public key that corresponds to the device private key.

81 • Runtime authentication

The process by which an authentication initiator (Requester) interacts with a Responder in a running system. The authentication initiator can retrieve the certificate chain(s) from the Responder and send a unique challenge to the Responder. The Responder then signs the challenge with the private key. The authentication initiator verifies the signature using the public key of the Responder as well as any intermediate public keys within the certificate chain using the root certificate as the trusted anchor.

4.6.3 Firmware and configuration measurement

Measurement is a term that describes the process of calculating the cryptographic hash value of a piece of firmware/ software or configuration data and tying the cryptographic hash value with the endpoint identity through the use of digital signatures. This allows an authentication initiator to establish that the identity and measurement of the firmware/software or configuration running on the endpoint.

4.7 SPDM messaging protocol

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- The SPDM messaging protocol defines a request-response messaging model between two endpoints to perform the message exchanges outlined in SPDM message exchanges. Each SPDM request message shall be responded to with an SPDM response message as defined in this specification unless otherwise stated in this specification.
- The SPDM messaging protocol flow depicts the high-level request-response flow diagram for SPDM. An endpoint that acts as the *Requester* sends an SPDM request message to another endpoint that acts as the *Responder*, and the Responder returns an SPDM response message to the Requester.

If supported

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SPDM messaging protocol flow

Requester Responder GET_VERSION-VERSION-GET_CAPABILITIES-CAPABILITIES-NEGOTIATE ALGORITHMS-ALGORITHMS-GET_DIGESTS-If supported DIGESTS GET_CERTIFICATE= If necessary CERTIFICATE--CHALLENGE-CHALLENGE_AUTH-

All SPDM request-response messages share a common data format, that consists of a four-byte message header and zero or more bytes message payload that is message-dependent. The following clauses describe the common message format and SPDM messages details each of the request and response messages.

The Requester shall issue GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages before

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issuing any other request messages. The responses to <code>GET_VERSION</code>, <code>GET_CAPABILITIES</code>, and <code>NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS</code> may be saved by the requester so that after the next reset the requester may skip these requests.

4.7.1 Generic SPDM message format

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The Generic SPDM message field definitions table defines the fields that constitute a generic SPDM message, including the message header and payload.

Generic SPDM message field definitions

Byte	Bits	Length (bits)	Field name	Description	
0	[7:4]	4	SPDM Major Version	The major version of the SPDM Specification. An endpoint shall not communicate by using an ncompatible SPDM version value. See Version encoding.	
0	[3:0]	4	SPDM Minor Version	ne minor version of the SPDM Specification. A specification with a given minor version extends a recification with a lower minor version as long as they share the major version. See Version recoding.	
1	[7:0]	8	Request Response Code	The request message code or response code, which are enumerated in Table 4 and Table 5. 0x00 through 0x7F represent response codes and 0x80 through 0xFF represent request codes. In request messages, this field is considered the request code. In response messages, this field is considered the response code.	
2	[7:0]	8	Param1	The first one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code.	
3	[7:0]	8	Param2	The second one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code.	
4	See Description	Variable	SPDM message payload	Zero or more bytes that are specific to the Request Response Code.	

95 4.7.2 SPDM request codes

- The SPDM request codes table defines the SPDM request codes. The **Implementation Requirement** column indicates requirements on the Requester.
- 97 All SPDM-compatible implementations shall use the following SPDM request codes.
- Unsupported request codes shall return an ERROR response message with ErrorCode=UnsupportedRequest.

SPDM request codes

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
GET_DIGESTS	0x81	Optional	See the GET_DIGESTS request message table.
GET_CERTIFICATE	0x82	Optional	See the GET_CERTIFICATE request message table.
CHALLENGE	0x83	Optional	See the CHALLENGE request message table.
GET_VERSION	0x84	Required	See the GET_VERSION request message table.
GET_MEASUREMENTS	0xE0	Optional	See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message table.
GET_CAPABILITIES	0xE1	Required	See the GET_CAPABILITIES request message table.
NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS	0xE3	Required	See the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message table.
RESPOND_IF_READY	0xFF	Required	See the RESPOND_IF_READY request message table.
VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST	0xFE	Optional	See the VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message table.
Reserved	0x80 , 0x85 - 0xDF , 0xE2 , 0xE4 - 0xFD	SPDM implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved request codes.	

4.7.3 SPDM response codes

- The Request Response Code field in the SPDM response message shall specify the appropriate response code for a request. All SPDM-compatible implementations shall use the following SPDM response codes.
- On a successful completion of an SPDM operation, the specified response message shall be returned. Upon an unsuccessful completion of an SPDM operation, the ERROR response message shall be returned.
- The SPDM response codes table defines the response codes for SPDM. The **Implementation Requirement** column indicates requirements on the Responder.

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SPDM response codes

Response	Value	Implementation requirement	Message format
DIGESTS	0x01	Optional	Successful DIGESTS response message format
CERTIFICATE	0x02	Optional	Successful CERTIFICATE response message format
CHALLENGE_AUTH	0x03	Optional	Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format
DIGESTS	0x01	Optional	See the Successful DIGESTS response message table.
VERSION	0x04	Required	See the Successful VERSION response message table.
MEASUREMENTS	0x60	optional	Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format
CAPABILITIES	0x61	Required	See the Successful CAPABILITIES response message table.
ALGORITHMS	0x63	Required	See the Successful ALGORITHMS response message table.
VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE	0x7E	Optional	See the VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message table.
ERROR	0x7F		See the ERROR response message table.
	0x00 ,		
Reserved	0x05 - 0x5F ,	SPDM implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved response codes.	
nesel veu	0x62 ,		
	0x64 - 0x7D		

4.8 Concurrent SPDM message processing

- This clause describes the specifications and requirements for handling concurrent overlapping SPDM request messages.
- 107 If an endpoint can act as both a Responder and Requester, it shall be able to send request messages and response messages independently.

4.8.1 Requirements for Requesters

A Requester shall not have multiple outstanding requests to the same Responder, with the exception of GET_VERSION addressed in GET_VERSION request message and VERSION response message. If the Requester has sent a request to

a Responder and wants to send a subsequent request to the same Responder, then the Requester shall wait to send the subsequent request until after the Requester completes one of the following actions:

- · Receives the response from the Responder for the outstanding request.
- · Times out waiting for a response.
- Receives an indication, from the transport layer, that transmission of the request message failed.
- 110 A Requester may send simultaneous request messages to different Responders.

4.8.2 Requirements for Responders

- 112 A Responder is not required to process more than one request message at a time.
- A Responder that is not ready to accept a new request message shall either respond with an ERROR response message with ErrorCode=Busy or silently discard the request message.
- If a Responder is working on a request message from a Requester, the Responder may respond with ErrorCode=Busy.
- If a Responder enables simultaneous communications with multiple Requesters, the Responder is expected to distinguish the Requesters by using mechanisms that are outside the scope of this specification.

4.8.3 Timing requirements

- 117 The Timing specification for SPDM messages table shows the timing specifications for Requesters and Responders.
- If the Requester does not receive a response within **T1** or **T2** time accordingly, the Requester may retry a request message. A retry of a request message shall be a complete retransmission of the original SPDM request message.
- The Responder shall not retry SPDM response messages. It is understood that the transport protocol(s) may retry, but that is outside of the SPDM specification.

120 4.8.3.0.1 Timing measurements

A Requester shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of a successful transmission of an SPDM request to the beginning of the reception of the corresponding SPDM response. A Responder shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of the reception of the SPDM request to the beginning of transmission of the response.

122 4.8.3.1 Timing specification table

The **Ownership** column in the Timing specification for SPDM messages table specifies whether the timing parameter applies to the Responder or Requester.

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Timing specification for SPDM messages

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
				Worst-case round-trip transport timing.
RTT	Requester	See the description.	ms	The maximum value shall be the worst case total time for the complete transmission and delivery of an SPDM message round trip at the transport layer(s). The actual value for this parameter is transport- or media-specific.
ST1	Responder	100	ms	Shall be the maximum amount of time the Responder has to provide a response to requests that do not require cryptographic processing, such as the GET_VERSION , or NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages.
T1	Requester	RTT + ST1	ms	Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that do not require cryptographic processing.
				For details, see ST1 .
	Responder	r 2 ^{CTExponent}		The CAPABILITIES message reports the cryptographic timeout, in microseconds. CTExponent is reported in .
СТ			us	This timing parameter shall be the maximum amount of time the Responder has to provide any response requiring cryptographic processing, such as the GET_MEASUREMENTS or CHALLENGE request messages.
T2	Requester	RTT + CT	us	Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that require cryptographic processing.
				For details, see CT .
RDT	Responder	2 ^{RDTExponent}	us	Recommended delay, in microseconds. When the Responder cannot complete cryptographic processing response within the CT time, it shall provide RDTExponent as part of the ERROR response. See the ResponseNotReady extended error data table for the RDTExponent value.
				For details, see ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady in the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.
				Amount of time that the Requester should wait before issuing the RESPOND_IF_READY request message.
WT	Requester	er RDT	us	The Requester shall measure this time parameter from the reception of the ERROR response to the transmission of RESPOND_IF_READY request. The Requester may take into account the transmission time of the ERROR from the Responder to Requester when calculating wT.
				For details, see RDT .

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
WT _{Max}	Requester	(RDT * RDTM) - RTT	us	Maximum wait time the Requester has to issue RESPOND_IF_READY request unless the Requester issued a successful RESPOND_IF_READY request message earlier. After this time the Responder is allowed to drop the response. The Requester shall take into account the transmission time of the ERROR from the Responder to Requester when calculating WTMax. The RDTM value appears in the ResponseNotReady extended error data. The Responder should ensure that WT Max does not result in less than WT in determination of RDTM. For details, see ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady in the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.

4.9 SPDM messages

- SPDM messages can be divided into the following categories, supporting different aspects of security exchanges between a Requester and Responder:
 - Capability discovery and negotiation
 - Responder identity authentication
 - Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1 and M2


4.9.1 Capability discovery and negotiation

- All Requesters and Responders shall support <code>GET_VERSION</code> , <code>GET_CAPABILITIES</code> and <code>NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS</code> .
- The Capability discovery and negotiation flow shows the high-level request-response flow and sequence for the capability discovery and negotiation:

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Capability discovery and negotiation flow

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4.9.1.1 GET_VERSION request message and VERSION response message

- This request message shall retrieve the SPDM version of an endpoint. The GET_VERSION request message table shows the GET_VERSION request message format and the Successful VERSION response message table shows the VERSION response message format.
- In all future SPDM versions, the GET_VERSION and VERSION response messages will be backward compatible with all previous versions.
- The Requester shall begin the discovery process by sending a GET_VERSION request message with major version 0x1.

 All Responders must always support GET_VERSION request message with major version 0x1 and provide a VERSION response containing all supported versions, as the GET_VERSION request message table describes.
- The Requester shall consult the VERSION response to select a common (typically highest) version supported. The Requester shall use the selected version in all future communication of other requests. A Requester shall not issue other requests until it has received a successful VERSION response and has identified a common version supported by both sides. A Responder shall not respond to GET_VERSION request message with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady.
- A Requester may issue a GET_VERSION request message to a Responder at any time, which is as an exception to


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Requirements for Requesters for the case where a Requester must restart the protocol due to an internal error or reset.

After receiving a GET_VERSION request, the Responder shall cancel all previous requests from the same Requester. Additionally, this message shall clear or reset the previously *Negotiated State*, if any, in both the Requester and its corresponding Responder.

Discovering the common major version



141 **GET_VERSION** request message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0×10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x84=GET_VERSION
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved

142 Successful VERSION response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x04=VERSION
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	Reserved	1	Reserved
5	VersionNumberEntryCount	1	Number of version entries present in this table (=n).
6	VersionNumberEntry1:n	2 x n	16-bit version entry. See the GET_VERSION request message table.

143 VersionNumberEntry definition

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Bit	Field	Value
[15:12]	MajorVersion	Version of the specification with changes that are incompatible with one or more functions in earlier major versions of the specification.
[11:8]	MinorVersion	Version of the specification with changes that are compatible with functions in earlier minor versions of this major version specification.
[7:4]	UpdateVersionNumber	Version of the specification with editorial updates but no functionality additions or changes. Informational; possible errata fixes. Ignore when checking versions for interoperability.
[3:0]	Alpha	Pre-release work-in-progress version of the specification. Backward compatible with earlier minor versions of this major version specification. However, because the Alpha value represents an in-development version of the specification, versions that share the same major and minor version numbers but have different Alpha versions may not be fully interoperable. Released versions must have an Alpha value of zero.

4.9.1.2 GET_CAPABILITIES request message and CAPABILITIES response message

- 145 This request message shall retrieve the security capabilities of an endpoint.
- The GET_CAPABILITIES request message table shows the GET_CAPABILITIES request message format.
- The Successful CAPABILITIES response message table shows the CAPABILITIES response message format.
- The Flag fields definitions table shows the flag fields definitions.
- A Responder shall not respond to GET_CAPABILITIES request message with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady.

150 **GET_CAPABILITIES request message**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE1=GET_CAPABILITIES
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved

151 Successful CAPABILITIES response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x61=CAPABILITIES
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	Reserved	1	Reserved
5	CTExponent	1	Shall be the exponent of base 2, which is used to calculate \mbox{ct} . See the Timing specification for SPDM messages table. The equation for \mbox{ct} shall be $2^{\mbox{CT}}$ microseconds (us). For example, if $\mbox{ctexponent}$ is 10, \mbox{ct} is 2^{10} =1024 us.
6	Reserved	2	Reserved
8	Flags	4	See the SPDM data types table.

152 Flag fields definitions

Byte	Bit	Field	Value
0	0	CACHE_CAP	If set, the Responder supports the ability to cache the <i>Negotiated State</i> across a reset. This allows the Requester to skip reissuing the GET_VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS requests after a reset. The Responder shall cache the selected cryptographic algorithms as one of the parameters of the Negotiated State. If the Requester chooses to skip issuing these requests after the reset, the Requester shall also cache the same selected cryptographic algorithms.
0	1	CERT_CAP	If set, Responder supports GET_DIGESTS and GET_CERTIFICATE messages.
0	2	CHAL_CAP	If set, Responder supports CHALLENGE request message.

Byte	Bit	Field	Value
0	4:3	MEAS_CAP	MEASUREMENT capabilities of the Responder. 00b . The Responder does not support MEASUREMENTS capabilities. 01b . The Responder supports MEASUREMENTS but cannot perform signature generation. 10b . The Responder supports MEASUREMENTS and can generate signatures. 11b . Reserved
0	5	MEAS_FRESH_CAP	O . As part of MEASUREMENTS response message, the Responder may return MEASUREMENTS that were computed during the last Responder's reset. The Responder can recompute all MEASUREMENTS in a manner that is transparent to the rest of the system and shall always return fresh MEASUREMENTS as part of MEASUREMENTS response message.
0	7:6	PSS_CAP	PreSharedKey capabilities of the Responder. 00b . The Responder does not support PreSharedKey capabilities. 01b . The Responder supports one PreSharedKey . 10b . The Responder supports derived PresSharedKey 11b . Reserved
1	7:0	Reserved	Reserved
2	7:0	Reserved	Reserved
3	7:0	Reserved	Reserved

4.9.1.3 NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message and ALGORITHMS response message

- This request message shall negotiate cryptographic algorithms. A Requester shall not issue a NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message until it receives a successful CAPABILITIES response message.
- A Requester shall not issue any other SPDM requests, with the exception of GET_VERSION until it receives a successful ALGORITHMS response message.
- A Responder shall not respond to NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message with ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady.
- The NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message table shows the NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format.

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The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table shows the ALGORITHMS response message format.

NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE3=NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	Length	2	Length of the entire request message, in bytes. Length shall be less than 64 bytes.
6	MeasurementSpecification	1	Bit mask. The MeasurementSpecification field of the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message and MEASUREMENTS response message shall define the values for this field. The Requester may set more than one bit to indicate multiple measurement specification support.
7	Reserved	1	Reserved
8	BaseAsymAlgo	4	Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purposes of signature verification. Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048 Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048 Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_3072 Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072 Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_4096 Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096 Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521 All other values reserved.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
	1	60	Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM-enumerated cryptographic hashing algorithms.
			Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_SHA_256
			Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SHA_384
12	BaseHashAlgo	4	Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_SHA_512
			Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_SHA3_256
			Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_SHA3_384
			Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_SHA3_512
			All other values reserved.
16	Reserved	12	Reserved
28	ExtAsymCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms (=A). A + E shall be less than or equal to 8.
29	ExtHashCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended hashing algorithms (=E). A + E shall be less than or equal to 8.
30	Reserved	2	Reserved for future use
32	ExtAsym	4*A	List of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
32+4*A	ExtHash	4*E	List of the extended hashing algorithms supported by Requester. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.

161 Successful ALGORITHMS response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x63=ALGORITHMS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	Length	2	Length of the response message, in bytes.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
6	MeasurementSpecificationSel	1	Bit mask. The Responder shall select one of the measurement specifications supported by the Requester. Thus, no more than one bit shall be set. The MeasurementSpecification field of the Measurement block format table defines the values in this field.
7	Reserved	1	Reserved
		4	Bit mask listing SPDM-enumerated hashing algorithm for measurements. M represents the length of the measurement hash field in measurement block structure. See the CHALLENGE request message table. The Responder shall ensure the length of measurement hash field during all subsequent MEASUREMENT response messages to the Requester until the next ALGORITHMS response message is M.
			Bit 0. Raw Bit Stream Only, M=0
	MeasurementHashAlgo		Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SHA_256, M=32
8			Bit 2. TPM_ALG_SHA_384, M=48
0			Bit 3. TPM_ALG_SHA_512, M=64
			Bit 4. TPM_ALG_SHA3_256, M=32
			Bit 5. TPM_ALG_SHA3_384, M=48
			Bit 6. TPM_ALG_SHA3_512, M=64
			If the Responder supports <code>GET_MEASUREMENTS</code> , exactly one bit in this bit field shall be set. Otherwise, the Responder shall set this field to <code>0</code> .
			A Responder shall only select bit 0 if the Responder supports raw bit streams as the only form of measurement; otherwise, it shall select one of the other bits.
12	BaseAsymSel	4	Bit mask listing the SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithm selected. A Responder that returns CHAL_CAP=0 and MEAS_CAP!=2 shall set this field to 0. Other Responders shall set no more than one bit.
16	BaseHashSel	4	Bit mask listing the SPDM-enumerated hashing algorithm selected. A Responder that returns CHAL_CAP=0 and MEAS_CAP!=2 shall set this field to 0. Other Responders shall set no more than one bit.
20	Reserved	12	Reserved.
32	ExtAsymSelCount	1	Number of extended asymmetric key signature algorithms selected. Shall be either 0 or 1 (=A'). A Requester that returns CHAL_CAP=0 and MEAS_CAP!=2 shall set this field to 0.
33	ExtHashSelCount	1	The number of extended hashing algorithms selected. Shall be either 0 or 1 (=E'). A Requester that returns CHAL_CAP=0 and MEAS_CAP!=2 shall set this field to 0.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
34	Reserved	2	Reserved
36	ExtAsymSel	4*A'	The extended asymmetric key signature algorithm selected. Responder must be able to sign a response message using this algorithm and Requester must have listed this algorithm in the request message indicating it can verify a response message by using this algorithm. The Responder shall use this asymmetric signature algorithm for all subsequent applicable response messages to the Requester. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
36+4*A'	ExtHashSel	4*E'	Extended hashing algorithm selected. The Responder shall use this hashing algorithm during all subsequent response messages to the Requester. The Requester shall use this hashing algorithm during all subsequent applicable request messages to the Responder. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.

163 Extended algorithm field format

Offset	Field	Description
0	Registry ID	Shall represent the registry or standards body. The ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table describes the value of this field.
1	Reserved	Reserved
[2:3]	Algorithm ID	Shall indicate the desired algorithm. The registry or standards body owns the value of this field. For details, see the Registry or standards body ID table.


- A Responder shall not select both an SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithm and an extended asymmetric key signature algorithm. A Responder shall not select both an SPDM-enumerated hashing algorithm and an extended hashing algorithm.
- This clause illustrates how two endpoints negotiate a base hashing algorithm.
- In Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1, endpoint A issues NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message and endpoint B selects an algorithm of which both endpoints are capable.

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Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1



The SPDM protocol accounts for the possibility that both endpoints may issue NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages independently of each other. In this case, the endpoint A Requester and endpoint B Responder communication pair may select a different algorithm compared to the endpoint B Requester and endpoint A Responder communication pair.

4.9.2 Responder identity authentication

- This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with the identity authentication operations of a Responder. All request messages in this clause shall be supported by a Responder that returns CERT_CAP=1 and/or CHAL_CAP=1 in the CAPABILITIES response message.
- The Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for the identity authentication for *certificate* retrieval of a Responder.

Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow

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RootCert Requester Responder 1. The requester sends a GET_DIGESTS GET DIGESTS 1. The responder sends a DIGESTS request message. DIGESTSmessage. 2. Compare digests in DIGESTS response SHA384_{Slot0} message to cached digests. Continue if no match is found. SHA384_{Slot3} SHA384_{Slotn-2} SHA384_{Slotn-1} If necessary GET CERTIFICATE 3. The requester sends a 2.For each received GET_CERTIFICATE request Offset (0) GET_CERTIFICATE request, the Length (0x2000H) responder verifies that Offset is within the certificate chain and then sends the CERTIFICATE response CERTIFICATE (1076, 0) 4. Verify validity of the signatures of each message based on the requested certificate (X.509 containing the public RootCert Length. If the actual CERTIFICATE key) in the certificate chain against the chain length is less than or equal to root certificate, then proceed to the VendorCert the requested Length (e.g. 1076 challenge-response. bytes), the Responder returns entire ModelCert certificate and a RemainderLength 0. DeviceCert

- The GET_DIGESTS request message and DIGESTS response message may optimize the amount of data required to be transferred from the Responder to the Requester, due to the potentially large size of a certificate chain. The cryptographic hash values of each of the certificate chains stored on an endpoint is returned with the DIGESTS response message, such that the Requester can cache the previously retrieved certificate chain hash values to detect any change to the certificate chains stored on the device before issuing the GET_CERTIFICATE request message.
- For the runtime challenge-response flow, the signature field in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message payload shall be signed by using the device private key over the hash of the message transcript. See the Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 table.
- 177 This ensures cryptographic binding between a specific request message from a specific Requester and a specific response message from a specific Responder and enables the Requester to detect the presence of an active adversary attempting to downgrade cryptographic algorithms or SPDM versions.

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Furthermore, a Requester-generated nonce protects the challenge-response from replay attacks, whereas a Responder-generated nonce prevents the Responder from signing over arbitrary data that the Requester dictates. The signature computation is restarted with the latest GET_VERSION request received.

4.9.2.1 Certificates and certificate chains

- 180 Each Responder that supports identity authentication shall carry at least one certificate chain. A certificate chain contains an ordered list of certificates, presented as the binary (byte) concatenation of the fields that the Certificate chain format shows.
- Each certificate shall be in ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 format. The ASN.1 DER encoding of each individual certificate can be analyzed to determine its length. The minimum number of certificates within a chain shall be one, in which case the single certificate is the device-specific certificate. The Responder shall contain a single public-private key pair per supported algorithm for its hardware identity, regardless of how many certificate chains are stored on the device. The Responder selects a single asymmetric key signature algorithm per Reguester.
- Certificate chains are stored in locations called slots. Each slot shall either be empty or contain one complete certificate chain. A Product shall not contain more than eight slots. Slot 0 is populated by default. Additional slots may be populated through the supply chain such as by a platform integrator or by an end user such as the IT administrator. A slot mask identifies the certificate chains from the eight slots.
- In this document, H refers to the output size, in bytes, of the hash algorithm agreed upon in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS.

184 Certificate chain format

Offset	Field	Size	Description
0	Length	2	Total length of the certificate chain, in bytes, including all fields in this table. This field is little endian.
2	Reserved	2	Reserved.
4	RootHash	Н	Digest of the Root Certificate. Note that Root Certificate is ASN.1 DER-encoded for this digest. This field is big endian.
4 + H	Certificates		One or more ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates where the first certificate is signed by the Root Certificate or is the Root Certificate itself and each subsequent certificate is signed by the preceding certificate. The last certificate is the <i>leaf certificate</i> . This field is big endian.

4.9.2.2 GET_DIGESTS request message and DIGESTS response message

- This request message shall be used to retrieve the certificate chain digests.
- 187 The GET_DIGESTS request message table shows the GET_DIGESTS request message format.
- 188 The Successful DIGESTS response message table shows the DIGESTS response message format.

The digests in the Successful DIGESTS response message table shall be big endian, and the digest shall be computed over the certificate chain as shown in Certificate chain format.

GET_DIGESTS request message

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Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x81=GET_DIGESTS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved

191 Successful DIGESTS response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x01=DIGESTS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMVersion field. (Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte.) The number of digests returned shall be equal to the number of bits set in this byte. The digests shall be returned in order of increasing slot number.
4	Digest[0]	Н	Digest of the first certificate chain.
4 + (H * (n -1))	Digest[n-1]	Н	Digest of the last (n th) certificate chain.

192 4.9.2.3 GET_CERTIFICATE request message and CERTIFICATE response message

- 193 This request message shall retrieve the certificate chains.
- The GET_CERTIFICATE request message table shows the GET_CERTIFICATE request message format.
- The Successful CERTIFICATE response message table shows the CERTIFICATE response message format.
- The Requester should, at a minimum, save the public key of the leaf certificate and associate it with each of the

digests returned by DIGESTS message response. The Requester sends one or more GET_CERTIFICATE requests to retrieve the certificate chain of the Responder.

197 **GET_CERTIFICATE request message**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value	
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10	
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x82=GET_CERTIFICATE	
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the target certificate chain to read from. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.	
3	Param2	1	Reserved	
4	Offset	2	Offset in bytes from the start of the certificate chain to where the read request message begins. Th Responder should send its certificate chain starting from this offset. For the first GET_CERTIFICATE request, the Requester must set this field to 0. For non-first requests, Offset is the sum of PortionLength values in all previous GET_CERTIFICATE responses.	
6	Length	2	Length of certificate chain data, in bytes, to be returned in the corresponding response. Length is an unsigned 16-bit integer. This value is the smaller of the following values: Capacity of the internal buffer of the Requester for receiving the certificate chain of the Responder. The RemainderLength of the preceding GET_CERTIFICATE response. For the first GET_CERTIFICATE request, the Requester should use the capacity of the receiving buffer of the Requester. If offset=0 and length=0xFFFF, the Requester is requesting the entire chain.	


198 Successful CERTIFICATE response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x02=CERTIFICATE
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the certificate chain returned.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
4	PortionLength	2	Number of bytes of this portion of certificate chain. This should be less than or equal to Length received as part of the request. For example, the Responder might set this field to a value less than Length received as part of the request due limitations on the internal buffer of the Responder.
6	RemainderLength	2	Number of bytes of the certificate chain that have not been sent yet after the current response. For the last response, this field shall be 0 as an indication to the Requester that the entire certificate chain has been sent.
8	CertChain	PortionLength	Requested contents of target certificate chain, as described in Certificates and certificate chains.

The Responder unable to return full length data flow shows the high-level request-response message flow for Responder response when it cannot return the entire data requested by the Requester in the first response.

Responder unable to return full length data flow



202 4.9.2.4 Leaf certificate

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The SPDM endpoints for authentication must be provisioned with DER-encoded X.509 v3 format certificates. The leaf certificate must be signed by a trusted CA and provisioned to the device. For endpoint devices to verify the certificate, the following required fields must be present. In addition, to provide device information, use the Subject Alternative Name certificate extension otherName field.

204 4.9.2.4.1 Required fields

Field	Description	
Version	Version of the encoded certificate shall be present and shall be 3 or 2.	

Field	Description
Serial Number	CA-assigned serial number shall be present with a positive integer value.
Signature Algorithm	Signature algorithm that CA uses shall be present.
Issuer	CA distinguished name shall be specified.
Subject Name	Subject name shall be present and shall represent the distinguished name associated with the leaf certificate.
Validity	Certificates may include this attribute. See RFC5280 for further details.
Subject Public Key Info	Device public key and the algorithm shall be present.
Extended Key Usage	Shall be present and key usage bit for digital signature shall be set.

205 4.9.2.4.2 Optional fields

Field	Description
Basic Constraints	If present, the CA value shall be FALSE .
Subject Alternative	In some cases, it might be desirable to provide device specific information as part of the device certificate. DMTF chose the otherName field with a specific format to represent the device information. The use of the otherName field also provides
Name otherName	flexibility for other alliances to provide device specific information as part of the device certificate. See the Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID.

4.9.2.4.3 Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID

```
DMTFOtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
    type-id DMTF-oid
    value [0] EXPLICIT ub-DMTF-device-info
}
-- OID for DMTF device info --
id-DMTF-device-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 4 1 412 274 1 }
DMTF-oid ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER (id-DMTF-device-info)

-- All printable characters except ":" --
DMTF-device-string ::= UTF8String (ALL EXCEPT ":")

-- Device Manufacturer --
DMTF-manufacturer ::= DMTF-device-string

-- Device Product --
DMTF-product ::= DMTF-device-string
```

```
DMTF-serialNumber ::= DMTF-device-string

-- Device information string --
ub-DMTF-device-info ::= UTF8String({DMTF-manufacturer":"DMTF-product":"DMTF-serialNumber})
```

207 ANNEX A (normative) Leaf certificate example shows an example leaf certificate.

4.9.2.5 CHALLENGE request message and CHALLENGE_AUTH response message

- This request message shall authenticate an endpoint through the challenge-response protocol.
- The CHALLENGE request message table shows the CHALLENGE request message format.
- The Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message table shows the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format.

212 CHALLENGE request message

208

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	s) Value	
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10	
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x83=CHALLENGE	
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the certificate chain of the Responder that shall be used for authentication.	
3	Param2	1	Requested measurement summary hash Type: 0x0 . No measurement summary hash. 0x1=TCB . Component measurement hash. 0xFF . All measurements hash. All other values reserved. When Responder does not support any measurements, Requester shall set this value to 0x0.	
4	Nonce	32	The Requester should choose a random value.	

213 Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x03=CHALLENGE_AUTH

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
2	Param1	1	Shall contain the slot number in the Param1 field of the corresponding CHALLENGE request. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate matched what was requested.
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMVersion field. Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte.
4	CertChainHash	Н	Hash of the certificate chain. It is used for authentication. This field is big endian. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate matched what was requested.
4 + H	Nonce	32	Responder-selected random value.
36 + H	MeasurementSummaryHash	Н	When the Responder does not support measurement or requested param2 = 0, the field shall be absent. When the requested param2 = 1, this field shall be the combined hash of all measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response. When the requested param2 = 1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0. When requested param2=0xFF, this field is computed as the hash(Concatenation(Measurement 1, Measurement 2,, Measurement N)) of all supported measurements.
36 + 2H	OpaqueLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field. The value shall not be greater than 1024 bytes.
38 + 2H	OpaqueData	OpaqueLength	Free-form field, if present. The Responder may include Responder-specific information and/or information defined by its transport.
38 + 2H + OpaqueLength	Signature	S	S is the size of the asymmetric-signing algorithm output that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. The CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation and CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification clauses, respectively, define the signature generation and verification processes.

4.9.2.6 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation

215

To complete the CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation process, the Responder shall complete these steps:

- 216 1. The Responder shall construct M1 and the Requester shall construct M2 message transcripts. See the Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 table.
- 217 where:
- 218 Concatenate() is the standard concatenation function that is performed only after a successful completion response on the entire request and response contents.
 - 219 If a response contains ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady
 - Concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and the response received during RESPOND_IF_READY.
 - 221 If a response contains ErrorCode~=ResponseNotReady
 - No concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and response.
- 223 2. The Responder shall generate:

```
Signature = Sign(SK, Hash(M1));
```

- 224 where:
 - $225 \circ Sign$
 - Asymmetric signing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Responder sent.
 - The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.
 - 228 ∘ sk
 - Private key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder in slot=Param1 of the CHALLENGE request message.
 - 230 · Hash
 - Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Responder sent.

The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseHashSel and ExtHashSel fields.


233 4.9.2.7 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification

- 234 Modifications to the previous request messages or the corresponding response messages by an active person-in-the-middle adversary or media error result in M2!=M1 and lead to verification failure.
- To complete the CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:
 - 236 1. The Requester shall perform:

```
Verify(PK, Hash(M2), Signature);
```

- 237 where:
 - 238 ° Verify
 - Asymmetric verification algorithm that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Requester received.
 - The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.
 - 241 ∘ PK
 - Public key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder with slot=Param1 of the CHALLENGE request message.
 - 243 ° Hash
 - Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last sent ALGORITHMS response message as received by the Requester.
 - The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseHashSel and ExtHashSel fields.
- The Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for the authentication of the Responder for runtime challenge-response.

247 Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow



4.10 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1 and M2

- The Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 table defines how the message transcript is constructed for M1 and M2, which are used in signature calculation and verification in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message.
- 251 The possible request orderings after reset are:
 - GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS , GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE
 - GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS , GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE
 - GET VERSION, GET CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE ALGORITHMS, CHALLENGE
 - GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE
 - GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE
 - GET DIGESTS
 - CHALLENGE

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After the Requester receives a successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response or the Requester sends a GET_MEASUREMENTS request, M1 and M2 shall be set to null. Immediately after reset, M1 and M2 shall be null. If a Requester sends a GET_VERSION message, the Requester and Responder shall reset M1 and M2 to null and recommence construction of M1 and M2 starting with the new GET_VERSION message.

253 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2

Requests	Implementation requirements	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
Reset	NA	M1/M2=null

Requests	Implementation requirements	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
GET_VERSION issue	The Requester may choose to issue this request any time to allow the Requester and Responder to determine an agreed upon Negotiated State. A Requester may detect out of sync condition typically when either the signature verification fails or the Responder provides an unexpected error response.	M1/M2=null
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS	Requester shall always issue these requests in this order.	A=Concatenate(GET_VERSION, VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, ALGORITHMS)
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS	Requester may skip issuing these requests after a new reset if the Responder has previously indicated CACHE_CAP=1 . In this case, the Requester and Responder shall proceed with the previously Negotiated State.	A=null
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE	Requester shall always issue these requests in this order after NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request completion or immediately after reset, if it chose to skip the previous three requests.	B=Concatenate(GET_DIGEST, DIGEST, GET_CERTFICATE, CERTIFICATE)
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTFICATE	Requester may choose to skip both requests after a new reset if it can use previously cached response to these requests.	B=null
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE	Requester may choose to skip GET_CERTIFICATE request after a new reset if it can use the previously cached CERTIFICATE response.	B=(GET DIGESTS, DIGEST)
CHALLENGE	Requester shall issue this request to complete security verification of current requests and responses. The Signature bytes of CHALLENGE_AUTH shall not be included in C.	C=(CHALLENGE, CHALLENGE_AUTH\Signature) . See the CHALLENGE request message table.
CHALLENGE completion	Completion of CHALLENGE resets M1 and M2.	M1/M2=null
CHALLENGE	Requester may choose to skip this request and forgo security verification of previous requests and responses. Requester may typically skip CHALLENGE when it issues GET_DIGESTS directly after reset.	
GET_MEASUREMENTS	If the Requester chooses to issue <code>GET_MEASUREMENTS</code> and skips <code>CHALLENGE</code> completion, M1 and M2 are reset to <code>null</code> .	M1/M2=null

4.10.1 Firmware and other measurements

- This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with endpoint measurement. All request messages in this clause shall be supported by an endpoint that returns MEAS_CAP=01b or MEAS_CAP=10b in CAPABILITIES response.
- 256 The Firmware measurement retrieval flow shows the high-level request-response flow and sequence for endpoint

measurement. If MEAS_FRESH_CAP bit in the CAPABILITIES response message returns 0, and the Requester requires fresh measurements, the Responder must be reset before GET_MEASUREMENTS is resent. The mechanisms employed for resetting the Responder are outside the scope of this specification.

Firmware measurement retrieval flow

1. The Requester sends a GET MEASUREMENTS request message.

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- 2. (Opt) Verify signature 3. Verify measurements match expected values.
- Requester Responder GET_MEASUREMENTS The Responder sends a (Opt) Nonce MEASUREMENTS response message. MEASUREMENTS Number of measurements. length, (opt) Nonce measurement blocks, (opt) signature.

4.10.1.1 GET_MEASUREMENTS request message and MEASUREMENTS response message

- 260 This request message shall retrieve firmware measurements. A Requester should not send this message until it has received at least one successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message from the responder. The successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response may have been received before the last reset.
- 261 The GET_MEASUREMENTS request message table shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format.
- 262 The GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message attributes.
- 263 The Successful MEASUREMENTS response message table shows the MEASUREMENTS response message format.

GET_MEASUREMENTS request message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value	
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10	
1	RequestResponseCode	1	xE0=GET_MEASUREMENTS	
2	Param1	1	Request attributes. See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table.	

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
			Measurement operation. A value of 0x0 shall query the Responder for the total number of measurements available.
3	Param2	1	A value of <code>@xff</code> shall request all measurements. A value between <code>@x1</code> and <code>@xfe</code> , inclusively, shall request the measurement at the index corresponding to that value.
4	Nonce	32	The Requester should choose a random value. This field is only present if a signature is required on the response. See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table.

265 **GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes**

Bits	Value	Description
0	1	If the Responder can generate a signature as shown in CAPABILITIES message, the value of this bit shall indicate to the Responder to generate a signature. The Responder shall generate a signature in the corresponding response. The Nonce field shall be present in the request.
0	0	Responders that cannot generate a signature as shown in the CAPABILITIES message shall use the value of this bit. For Responders that can generate signatures, the value of this bit shall indicate that the Requester does not want a signature. The Responder shall not generate a signature in the response. The Nonce field shall be absent in the request.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved

266 Successful MEASUREMENTS response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x60=MEASUREMENTS
2	Param1	1	When Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this parameter shall return the total number of measurement indices on the device. Otherwise, this field is reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
4	NumberOfBlocks	1	Number of measurement blocks (N) in MeasurementRecord . Shall reflect the number of measurement blocks in MeasurementRecord . If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is \emptyset , this field shall be \emptyset .
5	MeasurementRecordLength	3	Size of the MeasurementRecord field in bytes. If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this field shall be 0.
8	MeasurementRecord	L= MeasurementRecordLength	Concatenation of all measurement blocks that correspond to the requested Measurement operation. Measurement block defines the measurement block structure.
8 + L	Nonce	32	The Responder should choose a random value.
40 + L	OpaqueLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field in bytes. The value shall not be greater than 1024 bytes.
42 + L	OpaqueData	OpaqueLength	Free-form field, if present. The Responder may include Responder-specific information and/or information defined by its transport.
42 + L + OpaqueLength	Signature	S	Signature of the GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages, excluding the Signature field and signed using the device private key (slot 0 leaf certificate private key). The Responder shall use the asymmetric signing algorithm it selected during the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester, and S is the size of that asymmetric signing algorithm output.

4.10.1.2 Measurement block

Each measurement block that the MEASUREMENTS response message defines shall contain a four-byte descriptor, offsets 0 through 3, followed by the measurement data that correspond to a particular measurement index and measurement type. The blocks are ordered by Index .

The Measurement block format table shows the format for a measurement block:

Measurement block format

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Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	Index	1	Index. Shall represent the index of the measurement.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
1	MeasurementSpecification	1	Bit mask. The value shall indicate the measurement specification that the requested Measurement follows and shall match the selected measurement specification in the Algorithms message. See the Successful ALGORITHMS response message table. Only one bit shall be set in the measurement block. Bit 0=DMTF, as specified in the Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF table. All other bits are reserved.
2	MeasurementSize	2	Size of Measurement , in bytes.
4	Measurement	MeasurementSize	The MeasurementSpecification defines the format of this field.

4.10.1.3 DMTF specification for the Measurement field of a measurement block

The present clause is the specification for the format of the Measurement field in a measurement block when the MeasurementSpecification field selects Bit 0=DMTF. This format is specified in Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF.

273 Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
		1	Composed of:
			Bit [7] indicates the representation in DMTFSpecMeasurementValue .
	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType		Bits [6:0] indicate what is being measured by DMTFSpecMeasurementValue .
			These values are set independently and are interpreted as follows:
			[7]=0b . Hash.
0			[7]=1b . Raw bit stream.
			[6:0]=00h . Immutable ROM.
			[6:0]=0x1 . Mutable firmware.
			[6:0]=02h . Hardware configuration, such as straps, debug modes.
			[6:0]=03h . Firmware configuration, such as, configurable firmware policy.
			All other values reserved.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
1	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize	2	Size of DMTFSpecMeasurementValue, in bytes. When DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7]=0b, the DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize shall be derived from the measurement hash algorithm that the ALGORITHM response message returns.
3	DMTFSpecMeasurementValue	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize bytes of cryptographic hash or raw bit stream, as indicated in DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7] .

4.10.1.4 MEASUREMENTS signature generation

- To complete the MEASUREMENTS signature generation process, the Responder shall complete these steps:
 - 276 1. The Responder shall construct L1 and the Requester shall construct L2 over their observed messages:

```
L1/L2 = Concatenate(GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1, ...,

GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1,

GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn)
```

277 where:

- 278 ° Concatenate()
- 279 Standard concatenation function.
- 280 GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1
- Entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.
- 282 MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1
- 283 Entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to get_measurements_request1.
- 284 GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1
- Entire last consecutive GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.
- 286 MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1

- 287 Entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1.
- 288 GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTN
- Entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.
- n is a number greater than or equal to 1.
- When *n* equals 1, the Requester has not made any GET_MEASUREMENTS requests without signature prior to issuing a GET_MEASUREMENTS request with signature.
- 292 MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEN
- 293 Entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTN.
- Any communication between Requester and Responder other than a GET_MEASUREMENTS request or response resets L1/L2 computation to null.
- 295 2. The Responder shall generate:

```
Signature = Sign(SK, Hash(L1));
```

- 296 where:
 - 297 ° Sign
 - Asymmetric signing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Responder sent.
 - The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.
 - 300 ∘ sk
 - Private key associated with the slot 0 leaf certificate of the Responder.
 - 302 ° Hash

- Hashing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Responder sent.
- The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.

4.10.1.5 MEASUREMENTS signature verification

To complete the MEASUREMENTS signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:

307 1. The Requester shall perform:

```
Verify(PK, Hash(L2), Signature)
```

308 where:

305

- 309 ∘ PK
- Public key associated with the slot 0 certificate of the Responder.
- 311 PK is extracted from the CERTIFICATES response.
- 312 ° Verify
- Asymmetric verification algorithm that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message that the Requester received.
- The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.
- 315 Hash
- Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last sent ALGORITHMS response message that the Requester sent.
- The Successful ALGORITHMS response message table describes the BaseAsymSel and ExtAsymSel fields.
- The Measurement signature computation example shows an example of a typical Requester Responder protocol where the Requester issues 0 to *n*-1 GET_MEASUREMENTS requests without a signature, followed by a single GET_MEASUREMENTS request *n* with a signature.


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Measurement signature computation example



4.10.2 ERROR response message

- For an SPDM operation that results in an error, the Responder shall send an ERROR response message to the Requester.
- The ERROR response message table shows the ERROR response format.
- The Error code and error data table shows the detailed error code, error data, and extended error data.
- 325 The ResponseNotReady extended error data table shows the ResponseNotReady extended error data.
- The Registry or standards body ID table shows the registry or standards body ID.
- 327 The ExtendedErrorData format definition for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message table shows the ExtendedErrorData format definition for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message.

ERROR response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7F=ERROR
2	Param1	1	Error Code. See Error code and error data.
3	Param2	1	Error Data. See Error code and error data.
4	ExtendedErrorData	0-32	Optional extended data. See Error code and error data.

329 Error code and error data

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
Reserved	0x00	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
InvalidRequest	0x01	One or more request fields are invalid	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Reserved	0x02	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
Busy 0x03		The Responder received the request message and the Responder decided to ignore the request message, but the Responder may be able to process the request message if the request message is sent again in the future.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
UnexpectedRequest 0x04		The Responder received an unexpected request message. For example, CHALLENGE before NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Unspecified	0x05 Unspecified error occurred.		0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Reserved	0x06	Reserved	0x00	Reserved
UnsupportedRequest 0x07		The RequestResponseCode in the request message is unsupported.	RequestResponseCode in the request message.	No extended error data is provided
Reserved	0x08 - 0x40	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
MajorVersionMismatch 0x41		Requested SPDM Major Version is not supported.	0x00	No extended error data provided.
ResponseNotReady	See the RESPOND_IF_READY request message.		0x00	See the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.
RequestResynch 0x43 Responder is requesting Requester to reissue GET_VERSION to resynchronize.		0x00	No extended error data provided.	
Reserved	0x44 - 0xFE	Reserved	Reserved.	Reserved

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
Vendor/Other Standards Defined	ØxFF	Vendor or Other Standards defined	Shall indicate the registry or standard body using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.	See the ExtendedErrorData format definition for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message table for format definition.

330 ResponseNotReady extended error data

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value	
0	RDTExponent	1	Exponent expressed in logarithmic (base 2 scale) to calculate RDT time in uS after which the Responder can provide successful completion response. For example, the raw value 8 indicates that the Responder will be ready in 2 ⁸ =256 uS. Responder should use RDT to avoid continuous pinging and issue the RESPOND_IF_READY request message after RDT time. For timing requirement details, see the Timing specification for SPDM messages table.	
1	RequestCode	1	The request code that triggered this response.	
2	Token	1	The opaque handle that the Requester shall pass in with the RESPOND_IF_READY request message.	
3	RDTM	1	Multiplier used to compute WT Max in uS to indicate the response may be dropped after this delay. The multiplier shall always be greater than 1. The Responder may also stop processing the initial request if the same Requester issues a different request. For timing requirement details, see the Timing specification for SPDM messages table.	

331 Registry or standards body ID

For algorithm encoding in extended algorithm fields, unless otherwise specified, consult the respective registry or standards body.

ID	Vendor ID length (bytes)	Registry or standards body name	Description
0x0	0	DMTF	DMTF does not have a Vendor ID registry. At present, DMTF does not have any algorithms defined for use in extended algorithms fields.
0x1	2	TCG	Vendor is identified by using TCG Vendor ID Registry. For extended algorithms, see TCG Algorithm Registry.

ID	Vendor ID length (bytes)	Registry or standards body name	Description
0x2	2	USB	Vendor is identified by using the vendor ID assigned by USB.
0x3	2	PCI-SIG	Vendor is identified using PCI-SIG Vendor ID.
0x4	4	IANA	The Private Enterprise Number (PEN) assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) identifies the vendor.
0x5	4	HDBaseT	Vendor is identified by using HDBaseT HDCD entity.
0x6	2	MIPI	The Manufacturer ID assigned by MIPI identifies the vendor.

333 ExtendedErrorData format definition for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message

Byte offset	Length	Field name	Description		
0	1	Len	Length of the VendorID field. If the ERROR is vendor defined, the value of this field shall equal the Vendor ID Len, as the Registry or standards body ID table describes, of the corresponding registry or standard body name. If the ERROR is defined by a registry or a standard, this field shall be zero (0), which also indicates that the VendorID field is not present. The Error Data field in the ERROR message indicates the registry or standards body name, such as Param2, and is one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.		
1	Len	VendorID	The value of this field shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. The Registry or standards body ID table describes the length of this field. Shall be in little endian format. The registry or standards body name in the ERROR is indicated in the Error Data field, such as Param2, and is one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.		
1 + Len	Variable	OpaqueErrorData	Defined by the vendor or other standards.		

4.10.3 RESPOND_IF_READY request message


This request message shall ask for the response to the original request upon receipt of ResponseNotReady error code.

If the response to the original request is ready, the Responder shall return that response message. If the response to the original request is not ready, the Responder shall return the ERROR response message, set

ErrorCode = ResponseNotReady and return the same token as the previous ResponseNotReady response message.

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337 The RESPOND_IF_READY request message table shows the RESPOND_IF_READY request message format.

RESPOND_IF_READY request message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xff=RESPOND_IF_READY
2	RequestCode	1	The original request code that triggered the ResponseNotReady error code response. Shall match the request code returned as part of the ResponseNotReady extended error data.
3	Token	1	The token that was returned as part of the ResponseNotReady extended error data.

4.10.4 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message

- A Requester intending to define a unique request to meet its need can use this request message. The VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message table defines the format.
- The Requester should send this request message only after sending GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES and NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request sequence.
- The VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message table shows the vendor_defined_request message format.

343 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xFE=VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST
2	Reserved	1	Reserved
3	Reserved	1	Reserved
4	StandardID	2	Shall indicate the registry or standards body by using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.
6	Len	1	Length of the Vendor ID field. If the VendorDefinedRequest is standard defined, Len shall be 0 . If the VendorDefinedRequest is vendor-defined, Len shall equal Vendor ID Len , as the Registry or standards body ID table describes.
7	VendorID	Len	Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	ReqLength	2	Length of the VendorDefinedReqPayload .
7 + Len + 2	VendorDefinedReqPayload	ReqLength	The standard or vendor shall use this field to send the request payload.

4.10.5 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message

- A Responder can use this response message in response to VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST . The VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message table defines the format.
- The VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message table shows the VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format.

347 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.0=0x10
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7E=VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE
2	Reserved	1	Reserved
3	Reserved	1	Reserved
4	StandardID	2	Shall indicate the registry or standard body using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
6	Len	1	Length of the Vendor ID field. If the VendorDefinedRequest is standards-defined, length shall be 0 . If the VendorDefinedRequest is vendor-defined, length shall equal Vendor ID Len , as the Registry or standards body ID table describes.
7	VendorID	Len	Shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	RespLength	2	Length of the VendorDefinedRespPayload
7 + Len + 2	VendorDefinedRespPayload	ReqLength	Standard or vendor shall use this value to send the response payload.

4.11 SPDM messaging control and discovery examples

4.12 ANNEX A (normative) Leaf certificate example

350 Certificate:

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Data:
   Version: 3 (0x2)
   Serial Number: 8 (0x8)
   Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
   Issuer: C=CA, ST=NC, L=city, O=ACME, OU=ACME Devices, CN=CA
   Validity
       Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
        Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
   Subject: C=US, ST=NC, O=ACME Widget Manufacturing, OU=ACME Widget Manufacturing Unit, CN=w0123456789
    Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
            Modulus:
                00:ba:67:47:72:78:da:28:81:d9:81:9b:db:88:03:
                e1:10:a4:91:b8:48:ed:6b:70:3c:ec:a2:68:a9:3b:
                5f:78:fc:ae:4a:d1:1c:63:76:54:a8:40:31:26:7f:
                ff:3e:e0:bf:95:5c:4a:b4:6f:11:56:ca:c8:11:53:
                23:e1:1d:a2:7a:a5:f0:22:d8:b2:fb:43:da:dd:bd:
                52:6b:e6:a5:3f:0f:3b:60:b8:74:db:56:08:d9:ee:
                a0:30:4a:03:21:1e:ee:60:ad:e4:00:7a:6e:6b:32:
                1c:28:7e:9c:e8:c3:54:db:63:fd:1f:d1:46:20:9e:
                ef:80:88:00:5f:25:db:cf:43:46:c6:1f:50:19:7f:
                98:23:84:38:88:47:5d:51:8e:11:62:6f:0f:28:77:
                a7:20:0e:f3:74:27:82:70:a7:96:5b:1b:bb:10:e7:
```

```
95:62:f5:37:4b:ba:20:4e:3c:c9:18:b2:cd:4b:58:
       70:ab:a2:bc:f6:2f:ed:2f:48:92:be:5a:cc:5c:5e:
        a8:ea:9d:60:e8:f8:85:7d:c0:0d:2f:6a:08:74:d1:
        2f:e8:5e:3d:b7:35:a6:1d:d2:a6:04:99:d3:90:43:
        66:35:e1:74:10:a8:97:3b:49:05:51:61:07:c6:08:
        01:1c:dc:a8:5f:9e:30:97:a8:18:6c:f9:b1:2c:56:
        e8:67
    Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
   CA: FALSE
X509v3 Key Usage:
   Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    otherName:1.3.6.1.4.1.412.274.1;UTF8STRING:ACME:WIDGET:0123456789
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
    30:45:02:21:00:fc:8f:b0:ad:6f:2d:c3:2a:7e:92:6d:29:1d:
    c7:fc:0d:48:b0:c6:39:5e:c8:76:d6:40:9a:12:46:c3:39:0e:
    36:02:20:1a:ea:3a:59:ca:1e:bc:6d:6e:61:79:af:a2:05:7c:
    7d:da:41:a9:45:6d:cb:04:49:43:e6:0b:a8:8d:cd:da:e
```

4.13 ANNEX B (informative) Change log

352 4.13.1 Version 1.0.0 (2019-10-16)

Initial Release

353 4.13.2 Version 1.0.1 (2021-03-19)

- Minor typographical fixes
- USB Authentication Specification 1.0 link updated
- · Tables are no longer numbered. They are now named.
- Fix internal document links in SPDM response codes table.
- Added sentence to paragraph 92 to clarify on the potential to skip messages after a reset.
- Removed text at paragraph 156.
- Certificate digests in DIGEST calculation clarified at paragraph 190.
- Format of certificate in CertChain parameter of CERTIFICATE message clarified.
- Validity period of X.509v3 certificate clarified in Required Fields
- Subject Alternative Name otherName field in Optional fields references DMTF OID section.
- DMTFOtherName definition changed to properly meet ASN.1 syntax.
- Text in figures are now searchable.

- Fix improper reference in DMTFSpecMeasurementValue field in "Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF" table.
- Corrected example of a leaf certificate in Annex A.
- Minor edits to figures for clarity.

4.14 Bibliography

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DMTF DSP4014, DMTF Process for Working Bodies 2.6.